There is a continuous cycle between emotions and memory which continues to form and shape future beliefs, perceptions, and actions. By understanding this cycle at a deeper level, it provides the opportunity to understand how citizens are always drawing upon memories and the emotions which ground the memory to shape present and future interactions. Through understanding this cycle and the longevity of meaning to which memories play, members of Civil Society can be better informed on how their actions now are creating the memories which will set the agenda for years to come with citizens.
To understand this cycle, it is important to define what we mean by memory and emotions. The human brain has the capacity for two types of memory: semantic memory (general facts) and episodic memory (personally experienced events). It is episodic memory which is relevant here. Episodic memory allows one to reexperience one’s own past. Chaitan and Bar-On (2002) contend that by remembering a certain event in a certain way, the memory fulfils a psychological need of the person be it precisely true or not. According to Fellous and Arbib (2005) and Rolls (1999), episodic memory is facilitated by emotional states and thus, provides the advantage of an individual being able to remember many details. This intricate relationship between emotions and episodic memory means that the emotion may affect how the memory is stored and affect how memories are recalled (Feelous and Arbib, 2005, p.128). Levine and Burgess (1997) illustrate how emotions, specifically happiness, anger and sadness, impact the recalling of memory. They conclude that happiness is associated with better memory for the narrative as a whole, because “happiness acts as a signal that all is well and there is no immediate need for careful monitoring” (Levine and Burgess, 1997, p.159). Contrastingly, negative emotions lead to a focus on specific aspects of a problematic situation. Thus, when recalling or describing anger, Levine and Burgess believe that “there is an attention to, and enhanced recall, of the cause or agent that has obstructed one’s goal” (1997, p.160). Despite similarities in regard to greater detail, unlike anger, sadness is typically remembered with an attention to and enhanced recall of the negative outcomes and its implication (Levine and Burgess, 1997, p.160). Understanding the very real impact that emotions can have on episodic memory could help Civil Society understand why certain moments, for example when a community feel they were not consulted on a local project, is remembered in greater detail than the memory of a local NGO creating meaningful opportunities in a community.
But what are emotions? As Mercer reminds “the experience of emotion is not a mere product of cognition or a reaction to a belief. It is not an afterthought. Feelings influence what one wants, what one believes, and what one does.” (2010, p.2). Since the 1990s researchers in psychology and cognitive science have begun to address this deficit and change the way we analyse emotions and make sense of their contribution to behaviour. Most notably by Antonio Damasio (1994), psychologist and philosopher, argues that much of the way we view and analyse emotions is influenced by “Descartes’ error,”. This is the dualist belief that mind and body are separate and so are rationality and emotion. He suggests that we should instead understand emotions as a permanent feature of our thoughts and our understanding and perception of the world. For Damasio,
“to leave out emotions … [is to] leave out the prospect of understanding bioregulation comprehensively, especially as it regards the relation between an organism and the most complex aspects of an environment: society and culture” (2001, p.102).
This relationship is deepened by the tie that Damasio and others have drawn between memory and emotions. In their view memories are inherently emotional because of the role emotions play in anchoring memories. As Damasio notes “emotions and memory are so closely coupled that one cannot fully understand the latter without the former” (2001, p.102). As emotions anchor memory, they anchor an individual’s relationship to the past, shape the meaning that is given to this experience, and so mediate the nuances that are important to understanding the relationship between citizens and governments.
In Upheavals of Thought, Martha Nussbaum argues that “emotions involve judgments about important things, judgements in which appraising an external object as salient to our own wellbeing” (2001, p.19). The focus Nussbaum places on the inextricable link between one’s own wellbeing and emotions, relates back to the biological role of emotions, and their link to survival. In their essence, “emotions are states elicited by rewards and punishers, including changes in rewards and punishments” (Rolls, 1999, p.60). Where Rolls defines a ‘reward’ as anything for which an animal will work and a ‘punisher’ as anything that an animal will work to escape or avoid (Rolls, 1999, p,61). What distinguishes an emotion from a mood state is that an emotion is always directed at something, and thus always involves an appraisal or evaluation (Nussbaum, 2001; Rolls, 1999). Whilst feelings are the complex mental state that results from the emotional state (Damasio, 2001). Nussbaum and Rolls’ understanding of emotions are perhaps best understood in the context of Appraisal Theory. The Appraisal Theory defines emotions as “a series of appraisal processes, where emotional stimuli [are] evaluated and … the emotion is the outcome of [the] appraisal” (Öhman, 2006, p.42). According to Öhman (2006) the most basic appraisal is relevance. Does the stimulus have any consequences for one’s current goal scenario? Öhman explains “if it has no goal relevance, there is no emotion. But if the stimulus has the potential to enhance or impede one’s prospects of reaching a valued goal, it will evoke positive or negative emotions, respectively” (2006, p.42). The effect of emotions is twofold: firstly, there are behaviours which affect interactions which others (based on appraisal); and secondly, there are cognitive representations of emotional states (feelings) which affect future thinking, future planning and future behaviour (Damasio, 2001, p.104).
Important here is to recognise the two main categories of emotions: “reflex” emotions and “complex” emotions. When discussing the biological function of emotions, it is in reference to the primitive emotions, often called “reflex emotions”. These are the emotions that arise suddenly, involuntarily, and without conscious cognitive processing (Goodwin et al, 2007). They are limited in number, though counted differently. One framework identifies six reflex emotions – fear, sadness, shame, anger, joy and pride. Others vary slightly. These emotions constitute a way of processing information through mechanisms that are distinct from normal cognition. They are the quicker, more primitive, neurological routes that allow one to respond immediately (Goodwin et al, 2007, p.416). You could describe these six emotions as active emotions. One way in which you can see the socio-political force of these primitive emotions is through mobilisation. As there is a clear role for emotions in understanding what motivates an individual both to avoid and to seek actions. Fear, sadness, and shame “encourage individuals to avoid risk, prioritise security, and pessimistically submit to circumstances they find threatening”, and so contribute to resignation from mobilisation (Pearlman, 2013, p.388). In contrast, anger, joy and pride “increase acceptance, prioritisation of dignity, and an optimistic readiness to engage in resistance” and so motivate individuals to protest (Pearlman, 2013, p.388). This was clearly seen in the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder. Thousands of individuals across the world were outraged and angry in response to police brutality against a Black man and it triggered mobilisation which saw Black Lives Matters protests and marches across the globe.
If we accept that emotions are always oriented towards an object and so shape actions and responses, we begin to understand that “emotions are not locked in the hearts and minds of individual actors [which] allows … [us] to begin studying them as social processes” (Ross, 2013, p.37). Thus, allowing members of Civil Society a tool in which to understand community responses.
The description of emotions above suggests that the impact of reflex emotions is transitory. They arise suddenly in an encounter with a stimulus and then diminish and do not necessarily motivate further action. However, scholarship by Bar-Tal (2001) and Hutchinson and Bleiker (2014) suggests that emotions can linger and have a long-lasting influence on an individual’s and collective’s orientation. This section will now delve into these enduring emotions in which influence can carry over from one situation to another and will be referred to as “complex” emotions. According to Lindner (2006), humans display “the greatest variety of feelings and emotions of all species… [which] is due to the more recently developed prefrontal area and the older limbic structures of the brain” (p.271). A key set of emotions follow from this development and are linked to an individual’s capacity of objective self-awareness, which creates the potential for complex emotions such as embarrassment, empathy, and envy (Lindner, 2006, p.271). Thus, one’s capacity for self-awareness reveals how reflection of one emotional response may spark another. For example, fear may intensify resentment or betrayal of trust can spark anger (Ross, 2013). The result is a complex web of connections between emotions. Öhman defines two classes of complex emotions: object-oriented emotions and elaborated basic/object-oriented emotions (2006, p.43). According to Öhman (2006) one cannot consciously experience these emotions unless one is aware of the object (p.43). These emotions include attachment, caregiving, sexual desire, jealousy and social rejection (Öhman, 2006, p.43). The second grouping of complex emotions builds upon basic or even object-oriented ones, but “is cognitively elaborated to reflect cultural and social influences and is predicated on a self-concept” (Öhman, 2006, p.43). As Öhman (2006) illustrates through “the culturally cultivated fear of terrorism … [it] involves the basic emotion of fear” but woven into fear is a “network of objects – ‘the bomb,’ ‘evil ones’ – as well as socially determined beliefs about how the world is organised, characteristics of other nations and ethnic groups, and the perceived vulnerability of oneself and the group to which one belongs” (p.43). As Pearlman explains “when a [complex] emotion continues to influence a person’s social interactions after it is experienced, it can be called an affective orientation” (2013, p.391). This “affective” aspect of emotions is best understood through the idea of collective emotions.
Both emotions and memory are not confined to the individual. Their ability to take on meaning to a collective plays a major role in thinking about a community’s response to policy and government projects. Baele et al (2016) believe that each group will have an “emotional worldview”; where “emotional worldview” is defined as “an all-encompassing and coherent logic of understanding the social world that is based on the group’s collective memory, made of socially constructed axioms and myths that are reproduced in language” (p.724). As such, this emotional worldview will mean that a group possesses an “emotional disposition” that is an intrinsic propensity to trigger specific emotions, because a group will frame events in response to long-term sentiments (Baele, 2016, p.724). This emphasis allows for seemingly non-affective factors such as ideologies and culture to carry heavy emotional charges. As a result, events trigger not only one emotion but rather a set of specific emotions referred to as “emotional configuration” (Baele et al, 2016, p.724). These emotional configurations are “dependent on the emotional worldview because some axioms and myths are prone to produce resentment, while others trigger anger” (Baele et al, 2016, p.725). As a result, “society members experience collective emotions not only as a result of directly experiencing events that evoke particular emotions but also by identification with the society as a collective” (Bar-Tal et al., 2006, p.455).
This means, a project or policy does not have to directly impact an individual for an emotional response to be triggered. Instead, an individual can experience a sense of neglect or humiliation from a certain programme or policy by identification to the community. It is this notion of collective emotion which is important for those working in Civil Society to continually be aware of because its reliant on myths, which can be continued to be recalled through generations. Therefore, an individual could experience an emotional response from an event which was recalled by others (elders, parents, community figures) and because of association to this collective the experience will still create and stir an emotional response which shapes future decisions. It is the temperament of an emotional climate that provides clues to how prosperous relationships will be. An emotional climate dominated by a cluster of emotions such as fear, anger, guilt and hatred can lead to a collective dominated by beliefs that foster insecurity and distrust (Bar-Tal et al., 2006, pp.450-451). Whilst an emotional climate “dominated by more trust and solidarity, more personal security than insecurity, more hope than despair” (Bar-Tal et al, 2006, pp.452- 453) will aid the development of relationships.
A key aspect of how collective emotions can continue to be socio-political forces is due to the intricate relationship they have with the notion of collective memory. In Halbwachs’ (1992) On Collective Memory he describes that “we preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually reproduced; through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of identity is perpetuated” (p.47). Collective memory, Halbwach (1992) describes, “[is] a socially constructed notion and as such, it confines and binds our most intimate remembrances to each other” (p.53). Therefore, collective memory provides a way for a society to construct itself and make sense of its own past. Collective memory and history are thoroughly intertwined and mutually influencing, but it is important to emphasize the distinctions. History should be understood as the totality of facts and events that occurred in the past; it is objective, reflects no particular perspective, and creates a distance between the past and the present (Rusu, 2013, p.262). Collective memory, then, should be seen as subjective, reflecting a particular group’s past, interpretatively, and actively, in the sense that it continues to solidify a group’s identity.
“Society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them so that, however convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not possess” (Halbwach, 1992, p.51).
The ‘prestige’ Halbwach refers to, is closely intertwined with collective memory’s prominent identity function. As a consequence, these collective memories are seen to be conservative and resistant to change in order to preserve the self-serving established stories (Rusu, 2013). It is the resistant to change aspect of a collective memory that civil servants should be aware of when working with a community on a new project. Whilst organisations may believe their project is ‘new’ and the first of its kind, the community will remember past encounters with Civil Society and the identity of the community that was shaped in response to this encounter. It is the prominence of collective memory which can explain why for some communities, it will take years for trust to be restored if a previous encounter caused turmoil to a community and an encounter which continues to be recalled by the group because it acts as a story to solidify Civil Society as an ‘other’.
Eleri Connick
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